Abstract. We study the complexity of generic reals for computable Mathias forcing in the context of computability theory. The n-generics and weak ngenerics form a strict hierarchy under Turing reducibility, as in the case of Cohen forcing. We analyze the complexity of the Mathias forcing relation, and show that if G is any n-generic with n ≥ 2 then it satisfies the jump property
Introduction
Forcing has been a central technique in computability theory since it was introduced (in the form we now call Cohen forcing) by Kleene and Post to exhibit a degree strictly between 0 and 0 ′ . The study of the algorithmic properties of Cohen generic reals, and of the structure of their degrees, has long been a rich source of problems and results. In the present article, we propose to undertake a similar investigation of generic reals for (computable) Mathias forcing, and present some of our initial results in this direction.
The Mathias forcing partial order is defined as follows.
Definition 1.1. A condition is a pair (D, E) where D is a finite subset of ω, E is an infinite such subset, and max D < min E. A condition (D
Intuitively, the finite set D represents a commitment of information, positive and negative, about a set to be constructed, and E represent a commitment of negative information alone. Thus, for instance, the condition ({5, 6}, {9, 11, 13, . . .}) commits our set to contain 5 and 6, but no other even numbers, or odd numbers less than 9.
Mathias forcing gained prominence in set theory in the article [13] , for whose author it has come to be named. In a restricted form, it was used even earlier by Soare [18] , to build an infinite set with no subset of strictly higher Turing degree. In computability theory, it has subsequently become a prominent tool for constructing infinite homogeneous sets for computable colorings of pairs of integers, as in Seetapun and Slaman [15] , Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [3] , and Dzhafarov
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Our interest below will be in computable Mathias forcing, where the conditions are pairs (D, E) such that E is an infinite computable set. Other effective variants have been studied in the literature, such as when E is low or low 2 , and many of our techniques below can be appropriately modified to obtain analogous results for these versions. We shall show below that a number of results for Cohen genericity hold also for Mathias genericity, but that a number of important ones do not. The main source of distinction, as we shall see, is that neither the partial order, nor the forcing relation, is computable in this setting, so many usual techniques do not carry over.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out a framework for working with Mathias forcing in computability theory, and use it to prove some basic results about Mathias generics, in addition to listing several previously known ones. In Section 3 we define and study the Mathias forcing relation, and characterize the complexity of forcing arithmetical formulas according to their quantifier depth. Section 4 proves a number of results concerning the Turing degrees of Mathias generic reals, including that they are all generalized high. In Section 5, we then prove that, level by level, Mathias generic reals compute Cohen generic reals.
We refer the reader to Soare [17] for general background on computability theory.
Definitions and basic results
We assume familiarity with the basics of forcing in arithmetic, as presented, e.g., in Shore [16, Chapter 3] . Throughout, Cohen forcing will refer to the space of finite binary strings, 2 <ω , partially ordered by the usual extension relation, ⪯. For further background on Cohen forcing specifically, see [4, Section 1.24] .
Formalizing Definition 1.1 in the setting of computability theory requires some care. A slightly different presentation is given in [1, Section 6], over which ours has the benefit of reducing the complexity of the set of conditions from Σ (1) A (computable Mathias) pre-condition is a pair (D, E) where D is a finite set, E is a computable set, and max D < min E.
By an index for a pre-condition (D, E) we shall mean a pair (d, e) such that d is the canonical index of D and E = {x : Φ e (x) ↓= 1}. We adopt the convention that for all x, if Φ e (x) ↓ then Φ e (y) ↓∈ {0, 1} for all y ≤ x. Thus, if E is infinite, i.e., if (D, E) is a condition, then Φ e is total. Of course, if E is finite then Φ e may only be partial, in which case it will be defined on a proper initial segment of ω.
The definition makes the set of all indices Π 0 1 . However, we can pass to a computable subset containing an index for every pre-condition. Namely, define a strictly increasing computable function g by
Then the set of pairs of the form (d, g(d, e) ) is computable, and each is an index for a pre-condition. Moreover, if (d, e) is such an index as well, then it and (d, g(d, e)) are indices for the same pre-condition. Though we shall not be explicit about it, all our references to pre-conditions in the sequel should formally be regarded as references to indices from this set. Further, for notational convenience, we shall sometimes identify a pre-condition (D, E) with its index, thereby treating D and E as numbers.
Note that whether one pre-condition extends another is a Π 0 2 question. By our convention about partial computable functions, the same question for conditions is readily seen to be Π We call a set generic if it is n-generic for all n. We call a degree n-generic, or generic, if it contains an n-generic, or generic, set.
Remark 2.3.
A more typical approach would be to define n-genericity via the meeting or avoiding of all sets that are Σ 0 n relative to the complexity of the forcing partial order. (See, e.g., [16] , Definition 3.2.7.) For our purposes, n-genericity in this sense corresponds to (n + 2)-genericity according to Definition 2.2, and as such is a distinction in notation only. We prefer our definition because it will make clearer the connections between Mathias and Cohen genericity that we establish in the sequel, particularly Theorem 5.2.
The following proposition is the analogue of Lemma 2.6 (i) of [10] . The proof is essentially the same, but some small care needs to be taken since the set of conditions here is not computable. otherwise. For n < 3, we may thus wish to consider the following stronger form of genericity, which has no analogue in the case of Cohen forcing (or forcing in general). Definition 2.5. A set G is strongly n-generic if, for every Σ 0 n -definable set of preconditions P, either G satisfies some condition in P or G meets the set of conditions not extended by any condition in P.
Proposition 2.6. For n ≥ 3, a set is strongly n-generic if and only if it is ngeneric. For n ≤ 2, a set is strongly n-generic if and only if it is 3-generic.
Proof. Evidently, every strongly n-generic set is n-generic. Now suppose P is a Σ 0 n set of pre-conditions, and let C consist of all the conditions in P. An infinite set meets or avoids P if and only if it meets or avoids C, so every max{n, 3}-generic set meets or avoids P. For n ≥ 3, this means that every n-generic set is strongly n-generic, and for n ≤ 2 that every 3-generic set is strongly n-generic.
It remains to show that every strongly 0-generic set is 3-generic. Let C be a given Σ 0 3 set of conditions, and let R be a computable relation such that (D, E) belongs to C if and only if (∃a)(∀x)(∃y)R(D, E, a, x, y). Define a strictly increasing computable function g by
and let P be the computable set of all pre-conditions of the form (D, g(D, E, a)). If (D, E) ∈ C then Φ E is total and so there is an a such that Φ g(D,E,a) = Φ E . If, on the other hand, (D, E) is a pre-condition not in C then for each a there is an x such that Φ g(D,E,a) (x) ↑. Thus, the members of C are precisely the conditions in P, so an infinite set meets or avoids C if and only if it meets or avoids P. In particular, every strongly 0-generic set meets or avoids C. □
As a consequence, we shall restrict ourselves to 3-genericity or higher from now on, or at most weak 2-genericity. (This is also reasonable from the point of view of Remark 2.3.) Unless otherwise noted, n below will always be a number ≥ 3.
Proposition 2.7. Every n-generic real is weakly n-generic, and every weakly n-
Proof. The first implication is clear. For the second, let a Σ 0 n−1 set C of conditions be given. Let D be the set of all conditions that are either in C or else have no extension in C, which is clearly dense. If n ≥ 4, then D is easily seen to be Σ
If n = 3, this makes D appear to be Σ 0 4 but since C is a set of conditions only, we can re-write the antecedent of the above implication as
to obtain an equivalent Σ 0 3 definition. In either case, then, a weakly n-generic real must meet D, and hence must either meet or avoid C. □
The proof of the following proposition is straightforward. (The first half is proved much like its analogue in the Cohen case. See, e.g., [12] , Corollary 2.7.) Proposition 2.8. Every weakly n-generic real G is hyperimmune relative to ∅ (n−1) . If G is n-generic, then its degree forms a minimal pair with 0 (n−1) .
Corollary 2.9. Not every n-generic real is weakly (n + 1)-generic.
Proof. Take any n-generic G ≤ T ∅ (n) . Then G is not hyperimmune relative to ∅ (n+1) , and so cannot be weakly (n + 1)-generic. □
We shall separate weakly n-generic reals from n-generic reals in Section 4, thereby obtaining a strictly increasing sequence of genericity notions weakly 3-generic ← 3-generic ← weakly 4-generic ← · · · as in the case of Cohen forcing. In many other respects, however, the two types of genericity are very different. For instance, as noted in [ 
follows that no Mathias generic can have even Cohen 2-generic degree. This does not prevent a Mathias n-generic from having Cohen 1-generic degree, as there are high 1-generic reals. However, we shall show that this does not happen either in Corollary 5.1. However, in Section 5 we shall see that every Mathias n-generic degree bounds a Cohen n-generic degree.
Complexity of the forcing relation
Much of the discrepancy between Mathias and Cohen genericity stems from the fact that the complexity of forcing a given arithmetical formula does not agree with the complexity of that formula, as we now show. We work in the usual forcing language, consisting of the language of second-order arithmetic, augmented by a new set constantĠ intended to denote the generic real.
We regard every Σ 0 0 (i.e., bounded quantifier) formula φ with no free number variables as being written in disjunctive normal form according to some fixed effective procedure for doing so. Call a disjunct valid if the conjunction of all the equalities and inequalities in it is true, which can be checked computably. For each i (ranging over the number of valid disjuncts), let P φ,i be the set of all n such that n ∈ X is a conjunct of the ith valid disjunct, and N φ,i the set of all n such that n / ∈ X is a conjunct of the ith valid disjunct. Canonical indices for these sets can be determined uniformly effectively from an index for φ. Definition 3.1. We define the (strong) forcing relation, ⊩, for Mathias forcing recursively as follows. Let (D, E) be a condition and let φ(X) be a formula with only the set variable X free.
(
The above definition can also be obtained from a general one for forcing notions in the abstract, by the introduction of a valuation map. This is a monotone function V from the forcing partial order into 2 <ω such that for each n ∈ ω, the conditions p with |V (p) 
and so θ(a, D * * ) cannot force θ(a,Ġ). Thus (D, E) does not force φ(Ġ). The rest of 2 follows immediately, since forcing a formula that is Σ 0 1 over another formula is Σ 0 1 over the complexity of forcing that formula. We next prove 3 for n = 2. Suppose that φ(X) ≡ (∀x)(∃y)θ(x, y, X) where θ is Σ N θ a,b ,i , we obtain (1) .
To complete the proof, we prove 3 and 4 for n ≥ 3 by simultaneous induction on n. Clearly, 3 for n − 1 implies 4 for n, so we already have 4 for n = 3. Now assume 4 for some n ≥ 3. The definition of forcing a Π 0 n+1 statement is easily seen to be Π We conclude this section with a standard result about forcing implying truth. The proof, too, is standard, but relies on the complexity bounds from Lemma 3.3 and some of the particulars of our formalism. Thus, we include the details. 
Jumps of Mathias generic degrees
We begin here with a jump property for Mathias generics similar to the aforementioned one of Jockusch [10, Lemma 2.6 (ii)] for Cohen generics. It follows that the degrees d satisfying
yield a strict hierarchy of subclasses of the high degrees.
follows from the fact that G is high, as discussed above. That
is trivial for n = 2. To show it for n ≥ 3, we wish to decide every Σ 
The following result is the analogue of Theorem 2.3 of Kurtz [12] that every A > T ∅ (n−1) hyperimmune relative to ∅ (n−1) is Turing equivalent to the (n − 1)st jump of a weakly Cohen n-generic real. The proof, although mostly similar, requires a few important modifications. The main problem is in coding A into G (n−2) , which, in the case of Cohen forcing, is done by appending long blocks of 1s to the strings under construction. As the infinite part of a Mathias condition can be made very sparse, we cannot use the same idea here. Recall that a set is coimmune if its complement has no infinite computable subset. Also, let p A denote the principal function of the set A, i.e., the function that enumerates the elements of A in increasing order. 
Proposition 4.3. If
Construction. At stage s, assume (D s , E s ) is given. If there is no i ≤ s such that C i requires attention at stage s, we simply set (D s+1 , E s+1 ) = (D s , E s ). So suppose otherwise. The construction divides into three steps.
Step 1. Fix the least i such that C i requires attention and that we have not yet acted for, and choose the least corresponding b and earliest enumerated extension
Step 2. Obtain (D * * , E * * ) from (D * , E * ) by forcing the jump, in the usual manner.
Step 3. Let k be the least bit of A not yet coded. (By construction, this will be the number of stages t < s such that (
, where c is the least element of B A(k) ∩ E * * , which exists since B A(k) must intersect every computable set infinitely often.
Verification. Clearly, the entire construction is A-computable. To see that G = ∪ s D s is weakly n-generic, fix i and assume that each C j with j < i requires attention at most finitely often. Let h be the partial
is dense then h is total, and so it is infinitely often escaped by p A . Thus, at some sufficiently large stage, C i will require attention and no C j with j < i will. We will then act for i under step 1 of some appropriately large subsequent stage, thus ensuring that G meets C i , and that C i never requires attention again.
That G (n−2) ≤ T A follows by Theorem 4.1 from G ′ being forced at step 2 of the construction, which ensures that
(In other words, these are the stages at which code new bits of A.) Proof. By the previous proposition, ∅ (n) ≡ T G (n−2) for some weakly n-generic real G. By Theorem 4.1, if G were n-generic we would have ′ . Note that the usual proof of highness for Mathias genericity proceeds by thinning the infinite parts of conditions so as to eventually dominate all computable functions, and then appealing to Martin's high domination theorem. By contrast, the theorem below is proved by directly using the complexity of the forcing relation.
Theorem 4.5. If G is n-generic then it has degree in GH
This is thus a Σ 
Let σ witness this fact, as above. Then if P and N consist of the x < |σ| such that σ(2x) = 1 and σ(2x) = 0, respectively, σ
and D i is Π 
Relationship with Cohen genericity
We close by directly looking at how Mathias and Cohen generics compare to one another. As remarked at the end of Section 2, no Mathias n-generic set can have Cohen 2-generic degree. Theorem 4.5 above allows us to conclude the same for Cohen 1-genericity. Namely, since no GH 1 
Corollary 5.1. No Mathias n-generic degree is even Cohen 1-generic.
Thus, the degree classes of the two types of genericity are disjoint.
In terms of Turing reducibility, rather than equivalence, the situation is more complex. Obviously, for each n there is a Cohen n-generic, namely a ∅ (n) -computable one, that computes no Mathias generic, since the latter generics are all high. In the other direction, recall that GL n is the class of degrees d satisfying
. It was shown by Jockusch and Posner [11, Corollary 7] that every GL 2 degree bounds a 1-generic degree. Since this class includes every GH 1 degree, it follows by Theorem 4.5 that every Mathias n-generic computes a Cohen 1-generic. For our final result, we show that this can be strengthened to Cohen n-genericity.
Theorem 5.2. Every Mathias n-generic real computes a Cohen n-generic real.
Note that we cannot just code each finite string σ by the condition (D, E) with D = {x < |σ| : σ(x) = 1} and E = {x : x ≥ |σ|}, and have the generics line up. This would only be the case if the Mathias generic met and avoided all relevant sets by means of conditions of this form, but of course this will not be the case, as conditions of this form are not dense among all the conditions. In fact, we have the following proposition emphasizing this distinction.
Proposition 5.3. If G is Mathias n-generic and H is Cohen n-generic then H is not many-one reducible to G.
Proof. Seeking a contradiction, suppose f is a computable function such that f (H) ⊆ G and f (H) ⊆ G. The set of conditions (D, E) with E ⊆ ran(f ) is Σ 0 3 -definable, and must be met by G else G ∩ ran(f ) would be finite and H would be computable. So fix a condition (D, E) in this set satisfied by G. For all a > max D, we then have that a ∈ G if and only if a ∈ E and f −1 (a) ⊆ H. It follows that G ≤ T H, and hence that G ≡ T H, which cannot be. □ Theorem 5.2 is even more surprising because its analog in set theory is known to be false. (In the set-theoretic context, there is no restriction that the infinite part E of a condition (D, E) be computable. Rather, the infinite parts are taken to be elements of a fixed Ramsey ultrafilter.) Indeed, Miller [14, Section 6] showed that adding a Mathias generic real to a transitive model of ZFC does not add a Cohen generic real.
We now proceed to the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We approximate ∅ (n) by approximating iterations of the jump operator. We fix a uniform way of approximating the jump of a set, and for all m > 1, define We now wish to define a Turing functional Γ with which to convert Mathias n-generics into Cohen n-generics. For convenience, we regard such a functional as a partial computable map from finite sets under extension to 2 <ω , with domain closed under initial segment. As is customary, we write Γ F in place of Γ(F ), with Γ F = τ representing that Γ F (x) ↓= σ(x) for all x < |σ|, with use bounded by max F .
Construction. Define Γ ∅ = ∅, and suppose F is a given finite set. Let F 0 be the longest initial segment of F of size a multiple of n, and assume by induction that Γ F0 = σ has been defined. If the size of F is itself not a multiple of n, set Γ F = σ. Otherwise, F = F 0 ∪ {s 0 , . . . , s n−1 } for some distinct numbers s 0 , . . . , s n−1 > max F 0 . Then let Verification. In the construction, we are effectively thinking of each consecutive block of n many elements in F as defining a string. The key observation here is the following. Suppose that {s 0 , . . . , s n−1 } is such a block in F , and that the string σ defined by the previous block has an extension τ in W is an extension of (D, E) in C. This completes the proof. □
